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Daniel R. Brower
Social Stratification in Russian Higher Education
Higher education came to the Russian Empire as a privilege. From its beginnings in
the 18th Century it conferred special rights to graduates; soon thereafter, the state set
out to restrict university admissions to youth largely of upper-class, privileged back¬
ground. As the numbers of students grew and the importance of educational qualifi¬
cations increased among the country's bureaucratic and professional elite, higher
education became ever more closely bound to the dramatic social changes occurring
in Russia. By the early 20th Century it reflected in its internal evolution certain of the
conflicts leading the country to revolution. In this it was not unique among European
nations; a half-century before, students in Western institutions of higher education
had a direct part in the revolutionary movement. Nowhere eise, however, were condi¬
tions as acute as in the Russian Empire. The revolution of 1917 brought to a violent
end the old social order. It had a profound impact on the country's educational Sys¬
tem. Yet ironically a form of privilege re-emerged as the new Soviet state sought to
manipulate admissions to higher education to further its program of social revolu¬
tion.
This theme of education as privilege provides the central focus of the discussion in
the following pages on social stratification in Russian higher education. The pattern
of class representation among the students depended in part on specific policies ap¬
plied by the state and educational authorities. It also was influenced by the aspira¬
tions of segments of the Russian population to obtain access to higher learning as a
path of upward—or horizontal—mobility, a means of protecting a jeopardized social
position or of rising to higher status. By assessing the relative weight of government
policy and social aspirations we can hope to reach an understanding of the forces
which determined the changes in social recruitment from slow growth to sudden ex¬
pansion between the mid-19th and early 20th centuries.1
1. Enrollment figures can be found in Vera Romanovna Leikina-Svirskaia, Intelligentsiia v Ros-
sii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veke (Moscow, 1971), 55-56; William Johnson, Russias Educa¬
tional Heritage (N.Y., 1969), tables 32 and 33, 287-89; Nicholas Hans, History of Russian
Educational Policy (N.Y., 1964), table 13, 421.
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The Social Structure of Tsarist Universities:
Our indicator of social stratification in tsarist Russia is the legal system of estates
then in effect. Its social categories for grouping the population provide the sole evi¬
dence of Student origins in school records. Unfortunately they bore only a remote
connection to the real occupation and actual social standing of the families. Lacking
more reliable data, we must use their crude labeis. The estate most nearly approach-
ing the designation of "elite" was that of nobility, usually grouped in the records
with state bureaucracy. Originally the nobility had constituted the service pool for
administrative and military needs of the tsarist state, and had received in exchange
the exclusive right to landed estates and serfs. On the eve of the serf emancipation in
1861, only one-fourth held land providing substantial wealth, and probably one-half
needed supplementary income to support their families. Emancipation of the serfs
meant for many nobles financial ruin and emigration to the cities, where often they
sought administrative service for themselves and higher education for their sons as
principal means to avoid becoming declasse in fact if not legally.
Despite this process of partial melding of landed nobility and bureaucracy, the lat¬
ter slowly emerged as a distinct and powerful group in Russian society. Non-nobles
could enter state and local bureaucracy, and might hope to achieve the title of heredi-
tary nobility if they advanced to high rank. Yet the majority of the bureaucracy re¬
mained dependent upon their service for livelihood, avoiding the purchase of estates
even when noble by legal title. The boundaries between the landed nobility and bu¬
reaucracy were vague, but occupational patterns and property holdings were suffi¬
ciently distinct to justify calling.the bureaucracy the new elite of the Empire.
Among the urban population, only the estates of merchantry and "honorary citi¬
zenry" could claim some of the honor attached to the nobility. The merchant estate
came by the end of the 19th Century to inciude many temporary "merchants" who
had paid the required legal fees solely to have the right to engage in large-scale com¬
merce and industry. The honorary Citizens constituted an assorted group of urban
Professionals whom the State sought to honor—and encourage—by a special mark of
social status. In effect, the two estates represented an upper middle class, mingling
more traditional and new occupations.
Occupying a special category in Russian society was the priesthood, until the 1860s
a closed estate socially isolated by legal restrictions. Guardians of the spiritual well¬
being and political loyalty of their flock, the parish priests struggled on miserable in¬
comes to raise large families. Freedom granted in the 1860s to pursue new occupa¬
tions and to enter other estates brought an influx of priests' sons into higher educa¬
tion. The priesthood, like the merchantry and nobility, was very small. The national
census of 1897 revealed that these three estates each represented approximately one
percent of the Empire's population.
Most closely resembling a lower middle class was the estate designated as "petty
bourgeoisie (meshchanstvo)" usually grouped with the urban artisans. Both titles
could be acquired by special legal procedures, but were usually passed on from par¬
ents to offspring with no requirement as to means of livelihood. The occupations
practiced by those belonging to these estates filled a large ränge of urban trades and
professions, including by the end ofthe 19th Century a number of white-collar posi-
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tions as well as some skilled trades and petty commerce. The petty bourgeoisie con¬
stituted about 10 percent of the inhabitants of Russia at that time.
The single largest estate of the land was the peasantry. The category had desig¬
nated until the mid-19th Century the serf population, working the land as the chattel
of landowners or of the state. The abolition of serfdorn granted them legal personal¬
ity but left in effect many of the constraints which kept them formally bound to their
village and estate of birth. The economic growth of the urban areas of the country
transformed millions of these legally classified "peasants" into urban migrants,
working often as laborers in factories, day laborers, and some as small-scale entre¬
preneurs, middlemen and tradesmen. Among the peasants working as farmers, a few
succeeded in turning their agricultural activities into a source of substantial wealth. It
is fair to assume that those rare peasant offspring who appeared among Russia's stu¬
dents were from the urbanized peasants or the relatively well-to-do farmers, lower
class only relative to noble or merchant. The poverty and lack of educational oppor¬
tunity of most Russian peasants effectively deprived their children of formal educa¬
tion, save perhaps a year or two of grammar school, until the very end of the tsarist
regime.
The presence of these various social groups among the country's Student popula¬
tion is revealed—imperfectly and incompletely—in the governmental statistics on en¬
rollment in higher education. The Ministry of Education kept the most complete re¬
cords, but these apply only to the universities. The technical schools were under the
Jurisdiction of a wide variety of agencies, whose methods of tabulation were uncoor¬
dinated and frequently nonexistent. Thus we must look for clues indicating the gen¬
eral trend in figures on enrollment which are in fact only a partial listing. The chang¬
ing pattern of university enrollments, for which alone we can construct a continuous
series, is displayed in Table 1. The most notable change was the gradual decline in
the percentage of the nobility/bureaucracy, falling from 67 percent to 35 percent.
These figures hide a much more dramatic fall in the proportion of hereditary no¬
bles. In 1914, they constituted only eight percent of the total; 30 years before, in
1880, their share ofthe Student population was 23 percent. In absolute numbers, they
were slightly more numerous in 1914 than in 1880, but the expanding enrollments
were engulfing the old elite. The mid-19th Century was their moment of predomi-
nance—almost 60 percent ofthe students at St. Petersburg University were nobles;2
20 years later, they represented only 23 percent.3 On the other hand, the proportion
of sons of bureaucrats remained relatively constant, keeping pace with the rising en¬
rollments. It rose slightly from 19 percent to 24 percent at St. Petersburg University
between 1859 and 1880; overall, it rose from 23 percent in 1880 to 27 percent in 1914.
The bureaucracy had established itself as a substantial beneficiary of higher educa¬
tion.
The other significant trend is the increase in proportion of sons of the petty bour¬
geoisie. If those ofthe peasantry are added to their numbers, the Russian universities
by 1914 included among their students over one-third from the lower and lower-mid-
2. Tsentrarnyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv v Leningrade [abbrev. TsGIAL], fond (f.)
773, opis (o.) 95, delo (d.) 172 ("St. Petersburg University Report for 1859"), listy (11.) 333-
34.
3. Leikina-Svirskaia, 62.
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Table 1: University Students: Social Composition by Estates, 1865-1914
(Percent Distribution)
Estate 1865 1880 1895 1900 1907 1914
Nobility/Bureaucracy 67 47 46 52 45 35
Priesthood 9 23 5 8 11 10
Merchantry/Honorary
citizenry
3 8 7 12 12 11
Petty Bourgeoisie 5 11 32 20 22 23
Peasantry 13 3 6 5 6 13
Other 4 8 4 3 4 6
Sources: A. Rashin,
'
zapiski, v. 37 (1951);
'Gramotnost
, 78; V. R.
'
i narodnoe obrazovanie v Rossii,"
Leikina-Svirskaia, Intelligentsiia
Istoricheskie
v Rossii
(Moscow, 1971), 62-64.
die classes. The displacement of the nobility and gradual rise of these new classes
suggests a gradual process of "democratization" in the social composition of Rus-
sia's Student population. This generalization appears appropriate as well when the
meager figures on the social origins of students in technical schools are examined. In
the early 1870s, the nobility/bureaucracy dominated these schools almost to the same
extent as the universities (55 percent of the students in six technical schools).4 By
1914, their proportion had declined to 25 percent (the relative share of bureaucracy
and nobility is impossible to determine); that of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry
had risen from 35 percent to 54 percent.5 The long-term trends in the two groups of
advanced schools thus coincided.
It is very difficult to read into the statistics on estates the actual social background
and condition of the students. Thanks to a student-organized survey in one of the
country's leading technical schools, we have a detailed profile of one important seg¬
ment of the Student population in the last years of the tsarist regime. The St. Peters¬
burg Technological Institute was surveyed by a Student group to elicit information on
the political attitudes, social background, and financial condition of the students in
order to draw a political portrait of the "typical" Institute youth. The 2,000 students
tended to resemble their cousins across the river in the university by the relatively
strong representation of the noble-bureaucrat group, 38 percent of the total (accord¬
ing to figures for 1913). However, like the other technical schools, the petty bourgeoi-
4. TsGIAL, f. 908, o, 1, d, 125, 1. 88.
5. Hans, Table 34, 290 (figures drawn from enrollment in five technical institutes).
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Table 2: Selectivity Index: All Russian Students 1914
Estate
Population of
Russian Empire,
(percent)
1897
Russian Students
1914
(estimated)
30.3
Selectivity Index
(Student/Population
Ratio)
Nobility/Bureaucracy 1.4 21.6
Merchantry/Honorary
Citizens
0.5 12.5 25
Priesthood 0.5 6.4 12.8
Petty Bourgeoisie 10.6 28 2.6
Peasantry and Cossacks 79.4 18.5 0.2
Note and Sources: The census of 1897 is the only reliable source on estate
distribution for the late tsarist period; the estimated Student population
is James McClelland, "Higher Education in Soviet Russia, 1921-28," Past and
Present, 80 (August 1978), Table 5, 137. Census figures appear in Qbshchii
svod po Imperii (St. Petersburg, 1905), 1:160-63.
sie provided a large number of students, 30 percent, and the peasantry another 13
percent, while merchantry and honorary Citizens constituted 14 percent.6 The ques¬
tionnaires sent to all the students were returned by only one-half, but the social
break-down of this group corresponded very closely to the total Student body. As in
earlier times, the majority of the students lived on incomes which bordered on pover¬
ty; 60 percent revealed that their monthly expenses were below the level considered
sufficient for satisfactory housing and food. About five percent reported that they
could not count on a daily main meal. Only 20 percent had incomes which allowed
them to live comfortably. Although this group probably came largely from families of
merchants and nobles, among the privileged estate of the empire were many families
living on small incomes, often obliged to work at salaried positions to make ends
meet. Only half of the students could count on their families to provide them with
füll financial support.7 In other words, for one-half of the parents the entry of their
sons in the Institute represented the hope of real social and economic advancement
in Russian society.
These findings from the institute suggest that one must use with great caution the
indicators of social inequality for Russian higher education. The only quantitative
method measuring inequality suitable to the available data on stratification, with all
their imperfections, is the index of selectivity. Table 2 presents the results of calcula-
6. Teknologicheskii Institut: sto let (1828-1928) (Leningrad, 1929), 1:38.
7. M. V. Bernatskii (ed.), K. kharakteristike sovremennogo studenta (St. Petersburg, 1911), 20-
21,47,59.
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tions for all students in 1914. It reveals, as could be expected, that the nobility and
merchantry were the most over-represented, peasantry the most under-represented
among the students. The soundest conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that
higher education continued to cater to the legally privileged, though the actual social
standing of these students from the nobility/bureaucracy or merchantry frequently
differed little from their unprivileged classmates. What factors explain their tena-
cious hold over advanced learning? What contrary forces were behind the gradual,
belated rise ofthe "middle classes" among Russia's students?
The Causes ofthe Social Transformation:
The answers to these questions may be found in the changing patterns of official pol¬
icy toward social recruitment into higher education and of populär attitudes among
Russia's social classes toward the desirability and accessibility of that peculiar form
of training for adult life. Government attitudes oscillated between restrictive and ex¬
pansionist practices, reflecting the contradictory concerns of increasing the trained
elite of the country and of assuring the political reliability of educated Russians. At
the beginning ofthe 19th Century, Alexander I had indicated a desire that advanced
learning, then still in its infancy, be open to all Russians of talent (except, of course,
serfs). The fear of revolution prompted his successor, Nicholas I, to alter this policy.
His minister of education, Sergei Uvarov, declared in 1835 that a proper system of
public education should "offer opportunities to each one to receive that education
which would correspond to his mode of life and to his future calling in society."8 Ten
years later, he stated clearly his wish that the elitist education provided by the sec¬
ondary schools (gymnasia) and universities be reserved for "noble and bureaucrat
children, while the middle estates will turn to the district schools."9 This static view
of education corresponded to a static view of society, in which social position
counted for more than merit and access to higher education remained a privilege of
birth. In this manner the virus of social discontent and political radicalism was to be
kept from penetrating Russian society.
Ironically, in those years the state had to cajole and entice the landed nobility to
send their offspring to civilian schools. Alexander I for a time barred entry to the bu¬
reaucracy to anyone without some secondary training; Nicholas I opened special
secondary schools providing virtually free room and board exclusively to the nobili¬
ty. Gradually the realization spread among the provincial landed nobility that their
offspring might find profit and prestige in advanced schooling. In the sarcastic words
of the novelist Goncharov, these petty nobles became aware "that people could not
make their way in life—that is acquire rank, orders of merit, and money except
through education," which to them constituted "something calied a diploma" ac¬
quired by "not merely a knowledge of reading and writing but of other hitherto un-
heard-of subjects."10 By the 1840s, this policy appeared successful. The gymnasia
8. Quoted in Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia (Los Angeles,
1959), 141.
9. Quoted in Allen Sinei, The Classroom and the Chancellery (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 18.
10. Ivan Goncharov, Oblomov, trans. N. Duddington (New York, 1960), 135.
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were filled predominantly with sons of nobles and bureaucrats, who made up over¬
all 80 percent of the enrollment.11 In those years two special advanced secondary
schools catering to the nobility came into prominence, the Alexandrovsky (originally
Tsarskoselskii) Lyceum and the School of Jurisprudence. Both prepared a carefully
chosen group of noble youth for high government service and successfully carried
out Nicholas' ideal of incorporating advanced education into a rigid estate hierar¬
chy.12 Though the universities never achieved such social "purity," the state's prefer-
ential policies, combined with rising interest in education among the nobles and the
absence of both widespread opportunity and incentive on the part of the middle
classes, produced a social hierarchy in the universities much as Nicholas had de¬
sired.
The educational policies of Alexander II opened higher education to other strata
of the population. Following Russia's defeat in the Crimean War, the leaders of the
empire suddenly perceived that more and better advanced learning was a national
priority. The new minister of education preached the message that "learning is an ur¬
gent need."13 University enrollments suddenly doubled. Technical schools, pre¬
viously providing inferior vocational training, were elevated to the status of ad¬
vanced institutes conferring social distinction on their graduates. The problem of so¬
cially undesirable elements among the Student body soon reemerged following the at¬
tempted assassination of the tsar in 1866 by a part-time Student. Clear criteria were
needed to separate the chaff from the grain. The new minister of education, Dimitrii
Tolstoi, found these in controls on numbers admitted and in rigorous studies, arguing
in 1875 that advanced learning was for an aristocracy "of intellect, knowledge, and
hard work."14 Tolstoi's view reflected in part an elitist conception of higher educa¬
tion as the crucible in which the talented from all classes became infused with the
spirit of enlightened reason (Bildung); it also justified the indispensable increase in
Student enrollment.
The enticement of new occupational opportunities and the widespread recognition
of the distinction of learning combined to create a rush of students from the middle
as well as Upper privileged classes. The St. Petersburg Technological Institute,
founded in 1833, had barely survived in its first two decades in the midst of noble
disdain and real hostüity toward professionalization among the merchants and in¬
dustrialists of the country. Similarly, the Medical-Surgical Academy in St. Peters¬
burg, offering the best medical training in the country, managed in those years to fill
its Student ranks only by recruiting a large number of priests' sons trained in second¬
ary religious schools and malleable enough to accept an alternate career as military
doctor. Both schools benefited by Alexander II's reforms, becoming large, advanced
institutions of specialized learning and acquiring the reputation of centers of
"real"—i.e., scientific—learning. No longer shunned by the upper classes, the Tech-
11. A. G. Rashin, "Gramotnost i narodnoe obrazovanie v Rossii v XIX i nachale XX v.," Istori-
cheskie zapiski, 37 (1951), tables 47 and 48, 72.
12. Allen Sinei, "The Socialization ofthe Russian Bureaucratic Elite: Life in the Tsarskoe Selo
Lyceum and the School of Jurisprudence," Russian History, 3 (1976), 1-32.
13. Quoted in K. Timeriazev, "Probuzhdenie estestvoznaniia," Istoriia Rossi v XlXveke (St. Pe¬
tersburg, 1909), 7:2.
14. Sinei, The Classroom, 207.
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nological Institute found a majority of its students among sons of nobles or bureau¬
crats, trained in the elitist secondary schools, the gymnasia.15
The influx of an important contingent of students from modest, even poor back¬
ground marked the appearance of educational aspirations among the middle classes
during the 1870s. For these students, educational ideals focused on the opportunity
for financial security and social honors. Some came from noble families whose for¬
tunes were in serious decline. Others were from the upper and middle urban estates,
as well as the priesthood, all increasingly numerous among university students be¬
tween 1865 and 1880. Their presence was conspicuous among the upper class contin¬
gent because of "their excessively long coats, strong regional accents in conversation,
their snuff pouch, and clumsy movements."16 Poverty knew no estate limits, however.
The prevalence of economic hardship among the university students was confirmed
by a Student survey in Kiev University in 1870, which revealed that over one-third of
the respondents had no financial support from outside (parents, school, or state) and
70 percent were Iiving on what the surveyors regarded as insufficient means.17 Finan¬
cial hardship plus difficult studies produced numerous drop-outs from the advanced
schools (a memorable literary image of one appearing in the character of Raskolni-
kov in Dostoevsky's novel Crime and Punishment). Students whose lofty educational
ideals focused on rational thought and commitment to political and social progress
were dismayed by the apparently crass vocational interests of the "poor and undis-
tinguished" students. These latter, in the writer Dimitri Pisarev's opinion, sought
"the shortest road to rank, honor, large earnings, and consequently all the blessings
and enjoyments of life."18 Pisarev's goal of intellectual revolt was a luxury which the
poor students, however much they might sympathize with it, could not afford.
What did they hope to obtain through schooling? Testimony of contemporaries
uniformly answered that the rapid development of Russian economy, society, and the
state was at the origin of the new influx of less advantaged students. The director of
the Technological Institute explained in 1872 the flood of poor students in his school
as a consequence of "the success of industry, the development of a widespread rail¬
road network requiring a large number of specially trained technicians, and con¬
stantly increasing penetration of scientific elements into industrial production."19
The Industrial Revolution in Russia was beginning to stimulate social mobility and
professionalization, and the social profile of the advanced schools reflected the op¬
portunities for social ascent these changes created.
Even more possibilities for employment were appearing in the burgeoning State
and local administrations. These positions required higher learning credentials, in ex¬
change for which they offered secure, honored positions in society. In 1875 a govern¬
ment commission observed that advanced schooling was "more than ever before at¬
tractive to poor youth," who saw that a university diploma would "open to them a
15. TsGIAL, f. 908, o. 1, d. 125, 1. 88.
16. "Russkii vrach," Sovremennik, 89 (October, 1861), 582.
17. M. Benasik, Studenchestvo v tsifrakh (St. Petersburg, 1909), 8-10.
18. Dimitrii Pisarev, "Nasha universitetskaia nauka," Izbrannye pedagogicheskie sochineniia
(Moscow, 1951), 125-26.
19. TsGIAL, f. 733, o. 158, d. 127, 1. 37.
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variety of enticing careers which did not even exist before."20 Even educational au¬
thorities regretted the careerist attitude of this new type of Student, seeking "not
knowledge, but Privileges and rights." As a result of the training being given these
middle-class students, advanced schooling was facilitating "a transfer from one class
of the population to another rather than the acquisition of education."21
Deplorable to the old elite, the educational path to social advancement opened up
undreamed-of possibilities to the unprivileged and poor, whose numbers in Russia
were legion. Arnong them were the Jews, to whom Alexanders reforms provided
temporary hope for escape from the ghettos through education. When one Jewish
medical Student was expelled in 1874 for participating in Student unrest, his father
sent a petition to the minister of the interior begging for his son's readmission. "I am
a poor man," he wrote, "without any capital or property and completely at the mercy
of the future, for I depend [for my livelihood] on my work in the offices of the sugar
factory." He had labored for forty years and had spent his "very last savings for the
education of my son, in whom I place my sole support and hope."22 The evidence
thus suggests clearly that an awareness of the new possibilities for social advance¬
ment created by the sudden demand for an educated elite quickly penetrated the Up¬
per and middle classes of Russia, creating educational aspirations that were often im¬
possible to achieve.
Among the obstacles to success, difficult studies presented the most immediate
problem. Those students with the educational background and means to pursue their
interests in good conditions stood a much better chance of graduating than others. A
special report on graduates from Moscow University in the early 1870s found that, by
comparison with overall enrollment, sons of the nobility were more highly repre¬
sented among graduates than the lower class students, particularly the clerical stu¬
dents. The key factor was not social origin, however, but access to good secondary
education. The clergy's offspring were less likely to have received a gymnasium edu¬
cation than noble youth, since most came from the secondary clerical schools, the
seminaries.23 Hence they had a much harder time surviving the rigors of university
education. The result was to maintain the influence of privileged social background
among the graduates of advanced schooling.
The government set out in the 1880s to fight the rising tide of middle class stu¬
dents. As in the time of Nicholas I, the motive was the fear of political radicalism
among the students of unprivileged social class. The assassination of Alexander II in
1881 by a terrorist group led his son, Alexander III, to seek restrictive policies toward
higher education. The most famous of these new measures tried to choke off the flow
of undesirable students at the source—in the gymnasia. Named the "cooks' circular,"
this decree issued by the ministry of education in 1887 ordered that "with the ex¬
ception of those gifted with extraordinary capacities," the "children of coachmen,
servants, cooks, laundresses, small tradesmen, and the like" be discouraged from at¬
tending the gymnasia. In this revival of the static view of "the nature of things," the
20. Quoted in L. Kamosko, "Izmeneniia soslovnogo sostava," Voprosy istorii, Oct. 1970, 204-5.
21. TsGIAL, f. 733, o. 158, d. 210, 11. 13-14.
22. TsGIAL, f. 1282, o. 1, d. 339, 11. 287-88.
23. TsGIAL, f. 908, o. 1, d. 125, 1. 89.
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minister declared that the "existing inequality of fortune" was "unavoidable" and
that children should remain in "the sphere to which they belong."24 In the same
years, quotas were applied for the first time to Jewish youth seeking admission to the
gymnasia and universities; Moscow and St. Petersburg universities could permit only
two percent of their students to be of Jewish origin. The impact of these policies on
university enrollments was dramatic; the table on Student social origins reveals in the
late 1890s a drastic decline in the proportion ofthe petty bourgeoisie, the very class
most affected by the "cooks' circular" and anti-Jewish decrees.
The pressures for admission were nonetheless growing, most particularly among
the country's Jewish population. When one young Jewish boy from the southern
Ukraine was unable to enter his local gymnasium, his father, a well-to-do wheat
farmer, obtained a place for him in the neighboring technical secondary school (Re¬
alschule). He was going, or so his father thought, to receive a good education in Or¬
der to help manage the affairs of the farm. He did graduate from his high school and
was even able to enter Odessa University; his formal schooling went no further, how¬
ever, for he chose at that point to join the revolutionary movement, becoming as
Leon Trotsky one of Russia's most brilliant Marxist radicals. This path to manhood
represented precisely the educational pattern most feared by the state. Efforts of the
secret police to keep tabs on the Student population have provided us with records of
another alternative chosen by Russian families—education abroad. A file on Russian
students in the Paris School of Medicine in 1899-1900 reveals that 156 were enrolled
at the school that year; of these, one half (76) were Jewish.25 The choice of sending
sons and daughters abroad for advanced learning was in most cases forced on the
parents by government measures; that it was adopted at all is one clear indication of
the rising aspiration for education among the Russian middle classes.
The socially restrictive policies of the Russian educational authorities preserved
higher education in that country as the privileged domain largely of the nobility and
bureaucracy. The rise of this new elite exactly parallels the growth of university edu¬
cation through the 19th Century. Bureaucratic parents naturaUy sought to protect
their social position by ensuring suitable training for their offspring. The social pres¬
sures behind this trend are vividly illustrated by the history of one famous Russian
family. A son of a poor tailor from the Volga city of Astrakhan had in the years of
Nicholas I been able, through hard work and much sacrifice, to receive an education
at Kazan University, graduating from the Law Faculty. His immediate and most
promising opening was teaching, but he soon moved into educational administration,
playing an active role in the creation of a network of elementary schools in his dis¬
trict around the middle Volga town of Simbirsk. By the 1870s, his rank in the State
administration was sufficiently high to earn him the title of hereditary noble. He had
previously married the well-born and well-to-do daughter of a doctor. They had üve
children, all of whom graduated from gymnasia; some began advanced schooling.
The eldest son, a brilliant chemistry Student at St. Petersburg University, chose to put
the salvation of the Russian people ahead of his own career, and was executed for
24. Johnson, 155.
25. Hoover Institution, Okhrana Index 13h, Folder 3, "Releve des etudiants russes ä l'Ecole de
medecine."
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plotting against the life of Alexander III. The second son (who actually obtained his
law degree at his mother's insistence) became as Vladimir Lenin founder of the Bol¬
shevik party. Besides pointing up the futility of socially exclusive policies to guaran¬
tee Student political loyalty, this Ulianov family history fits quite well the pattem of
self-perpetuating prominence of the new (bureaucratic) elite among Russia's Student
population. In this respect the interests of the State leadership and of its bureaucratic
servants were compatible, at the expense not only of the middle classes but also of
the old landed nobility.
The last quarter-century of the tsarist regime witnessed the Virtual capitulation of
the State to the pressures for professionalization through expansion of enrollments in
higher education and for access to education by the middle classes of the country.
This change began in the 1890s with the development of an extensive network of
technical schools and institutes under the ministry of finance, most aware ofthe need
for educational training, then accelerated after the revolution of 1905. So many open¬
ings in the technical institutes and universities could be filled only by granting en¬
trance to the new middle classes and lower middle classes in greater numbers than
ever before, creating what in the eyes of conservatives could only be calied a socially
promiscuous Student body. The vocational interests ofthe middle classes led them to
tum particularly to the technical schools. For üve schools in 1914 with about one-
third of the total professional enrollment, the merchantry and petty bourgeoisie con¬
tributed over one-half of the students, and sons of "peasants" another one-fifth.26
Similarly, Moscow University proved responsive to these pressures; as center of Rus¬
sia's new industrial economy, it too was by 1916 predominantly made up of students
from the urban, "enterprising" classes.27 St. Petersburg University remained more
heavily weighted toward the nobility/bureaucracy, since it was the chosen spring-
board for entrance into the State administration. Similarly, the newly created network
of women's courses catered largely to the daughters of the country's elite (old and
new). Overall, the trend toward democratization of the Student population appears
the result of the primaey of socioeconomic development, that is, of the needs of the
State for educated Russians, and of the demands of the new classes for education for
their offspring.
Some students regarded themselves, though, as in no way beholden to their par¬
ents. In contrast to the efforts of many to remain as adults in a position equivalent to
or better than that of their parents, a sizeable group since the 1860s openly re-
nounced all ties to parents and to the estate dignities of birth. This is not the place to
discuss the forces which reshaped the mentality of this "student corporation."28 The
declaration ofa student leader in St. Petersburg University in the late 1850s is indica-
tive ofthe attitude he saw emerging among his classmates. He asserted in a speech to
a student gathering that "in the face of learning, there are no estates or titles or uni¬
forms." No longer were student youth to be divided by estate loyalties as "petty
26. Johnson, table 34, 290.
27. M. Tikhomirov (ed.), Istorua Moskovskogo unwersiteta (Moscow, 1955), 1 368-69
28. See Daniel Brower, Training the Nihilists: Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia (Itha¬
ca, N.Y, 1975), esp. ch. 4.
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bourgeois, merchants, bureaucrats, officers, or well-born Russian nobles," for there
remained "only adepts of learning."29
Though the entire student body never resembled such an exhalted image of apos-
tles of truth, student culture over the following half-century nurtured an attitude of
alienation toward family and class among at least a part of the youth in higher educa¬
tion. When it became possible after the revolution of 1905 to conduct public opinion
surveys, students had the opportunity to express themselves on this issue. One survey
at Moscow University asked 1,700 students whether their parents had had any part in
the elaboration of their philosophy of life; 58 percent denied that they had. When
asked if the parents had had any influence on the choice of academic study, 84 per¬
cent denied that they had. The commentator of these statistics concluded that "the
Russian intelligentsia has no family."30 In effect, higher education made its own con¬
tribution to the fires of social conflict. From the ranks of these disaffected students
came the cadres of the revolutionary parties, claiming leadership of the discontented
lower classes in the movement to overthrow the tsarist regime.
The Bolshevik Pattern:
Political realities, of diminishing importance for educational recruitment in the late
tsarist period, became a major factor once again after the Bolshevik Revolution. The
new leaders were themselves produets of an elitist educational system, trained in rig-
orous humanistic subjects and survivors of the ruthless process of selection which
eliminated so many youths. If some never completed their training, the choice was
theirs, based on the decision that revolution was more important than an academic
degree. The first commissar of education, Lunacharsky, appeared only briefly in the
University of Zürich, where an interest in philosophy led him to Marxism and soon
to the revolutionary Marxist Underground in Russia. As new leader of the educa¬
tional system, one of his first moves was to eliminate all entrance requirements to the
university. A September, 1918 decree of the commissariat declared that university
studies were open "to any person, regardless of citizenship or sex, who has attained
the age of 16."31 Democratization of higher education eliminated all handicaps, so¬
cial, financial, or racial, to talented Soviet Citizens seeking access to advanced learn¬
ing. Lunacharsky's ideal educational system was one in which "every child of the
Russian Republic enters a school of an identical type and has the same chances as
every other to complete higher education."32
However, the concept of democracy had special meaning for the new revolution¬
ary leaders. They had overthrown the old order in the name of and for the sake of the
laboring masses. The exploiting classes, on the other hand, were by their very origins
29. Cited in B. Modzalevskii, "Iz istorii Petersburgskogo universiteta, 1857-59 (Iz bumag L. N.
Modzalevskogo)," Golos minuvshego, January 1917, 141.
30. M. Izgoev, "Ob intelligentnoi molodezhi," Russkoe obshchestvo i revoliutsiia (St. Petersburg,
1909), 197-98.
31. Quoted in Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat of Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1970), 77.
32. Quoted in Gail Lapidus, "Socialism and Modernity: Education, Industrialization, and So¬
cial Change in the USSR," in Paul Cocks et. al. (ed.), The Dynamics of Soviet Politics (Cam¬
bridge, Mass., 1976), 201.
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potential enemies of the people. The Soviet State had to support the people and to
crush the former ruling classes who would, if given any opportunity, seek to Sabotage
and overthrow the new class dictatorship. Education was not exempt from class
struggle. Some leaders immediately sought to introduce class policies into the class¬
room. One of these militant educators was E. A. Preobrazhenskii. For him there ex¬
isted "a genuine class war at the doors of the advanced schools between the worker-
peasant majority of the country ... and the [former] governing classes and strata
linked with them." At issue was "the question of the numbers and social origins of
the future specialists." Though "the bourgeois and intellectual strata of the popula¬
tion are frantically trying to maintain themselves and their children at the level of
education and social position reached in the pre-revolutionary period," the working
masses want "to have specialists from among their own kin in their own state."33 The
lines were drawn between education open to talent and proletarianization. The poli¬
cies ofthe 1920s oscillated first one way, then the other as the Soviet State sought the
Solution to this dilemma.
All sides could at least agree that special measures needed to be taken to help the
working classes overcome their great educational handicap and to provide assistance
to those workers seeking to enter higher education. The first practical step in this di¬
rection was taken in 1919 by Communist students in a Moscow technical school, who
organized special preparatory courses for workers applying to their school. The idea
was adopted by the commissariat of education that fall, which calied for "prepara¬
tory courses at all Russian universities with the aim of preparing workers and peas¬
ants for higher education in the shortest possible time." Finally, a year later the
Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Republic gave these courses for
workers (in Russian rabochii fakultet, shortened to rabfak) legal status, specifying
that admission to such schools was open to workers and peasants sent by Communist
party organizations, labor unions, factory committees or local governmental organs.
Non-party individuals not engaged in manual labor were excluded, no matter who
might recommend them.34 The movement spread quickly. By 1926 there were 65 rab-
faki with 33,000 students. Of these, slightly over one-half declared themselves work¬
ers, and another 39 percent peasants.35 These figures are really only approximations,
since evidence of social origins was frequently falsified. Nonetheless, the program
represented a radical departure in educational recruitment, a program never at¬
tempted in any country before and one which successfully opened up higher educa¬
tion to many thousands of workers who in earlier years would have had little chance
of such educational opportunities.
Proletarianization of higher education quickly raised the proportion of workers
and peasants in universities and technical schools. Specific governmental guidelines
designated 8,000 openings in the universities in 1925 (out of a total of 18,000) for rab¬
fak graduates, and another 5,000 for individuals recommended by party, Young
Communist or trade union organizations.36 Moscow University claimed to be admit-
33. Lapidus, 204.
34. V. V. Ukraintsev, KPSS: Organizator revoliutsionnogo preobrazovaniia vyschei shkoly (Mos¬
cow, 1963), 71-73.
35. Lapidus, table 11.1, 208.
36. Lapidus, 203.
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ting 70 percent from the laboring classes among its entering class of 1924.37 Overall
figures on institutions of higher education in 1926 show that almost one-fourth ofthe
students were classified as workers, and the same percentage as peasants. The off¬
spring of the middle and former upper classes (noted as "white-collar employees"
and "other") represented now only one-half of the enrollment.38
The continued presence of the children of socially undesirable classes was hardly
surprising. The educational leaders and school authorities both continued to seek
compromise between proletarianization and talent. Students capable of undertaking
difficult advanced studies were most frequently of middle and upper-class origins.
State policy openiy encouraged families of technical specialists who worked for the
Soviet State, "progressive" even if their origins were bourgeois or noble, to send their
children to advanced institutes. The heritage of generations of students from these
classes could not be eliminated immediately, particularly as long as intellectual abil¬
ity was considered important. At insignificant little schools such as Smolensk State
University, a new creation of the Soviet State, recruitment into medical school posed
real problems. A survey of some ofthe medical students conducted in 1924 revealed
that only half could fumish documents certifying that they were of politically accept¬
able social origin, proletarian or working peasant. The survey also revealed that the
students were remarkably alike in lacking party or Young Communist affiliation, and
in having to support themselves by work to Supplement miserable stipends, Iiving on
the verge of poverty.39 The picture was a familiär one; like the tsarist leaders, the
Communists ofthe 1920s had to live with a socially promiscuous mixture of students,
and had to maintain a system of higher education on a slim budget.
The second factor preserving the place of the former advanced classes in the edu¬
cational institutions was the reluctance of many Russians even to consider such edu¬
cation desirable. The impact of open enrollments in the universities had at the start
led to an increase of middle-class students. One Moscow University professor com-
mented that "the proletarian masses did not come to us; it was the intelligentsia that
came."40 Though the rabfaki helped alter attitudes, the change (like that of the
landed nobility in the early 19th Century) was slow in Coming. A survey in 1925
among 2,000 peasant families revealed that only three percent even conceived of the
possibility of the completion by their sons or daughters of higher education.41 When
educational specialists studied the length of time rural and urban children remained
in school in the 1920s, the results of rural distrust of advanced schooling were clear.
Few rural boys and girls completed secondary education. As in late tsarist times, a
stay in school of two or three years was sufficient for peasant children, whose parents
still worked their own land and thus needed family labor.42
Democratization was a boon to the Jewish families. All restrictions on Jewish en¬
rollment were lifted by the Soviet State. The result was a rapid rise in the proportion
37. Istoriia Moskovskogo universiteta, 2:102.
38. Cited in Lapidus, table 11.1, 208.
39. Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 343-44.
40. Quoted in Fitzpatrick, 77.
41. Cited in David Lane, "The Impact of Revolution: The Case of Selection of Students for
Higher Education in Soviet Russia 1917-1928," Sociology, 1 (1973), 247.
42. Lane, table 5, 248.
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of Jewish students, particularly in the western areas (the former Pale of Settlement).
In the entire country, they represented 16 percent ofthe students in higher education
in 1927, while in the Ukraine their proportion was 26 percent. Their importance in
some of the professional schools, such as medicine, was even greater; 45 percent of
the Ukraine's medical students were Jewish in 1927.43 Since most of the country's
Jews had been engaged in small-scale trade and artisan activity, their social creden¬
tials were good, and their ability to master challenging academic subjects was proba¬
bly greater than that of a comparable group from the Russian population. Ultimately
the Russian Communists, like their tsarist predecessors, turned to anti-Jewish dis-
criminatory policies to preserve Russian predominance in higher education.
Women students also took advantage of the new policy of enrollments and the in-
ducements to seek new careers previously open only to men. In the cities, the propor¬
tion of girls completing secondary education was greater than that of the boys by the
late 1920s.44 Their impact on higher education was especially noticeable in the tech¬
nical schools, where they represented 42 percent ofthe students in 1928.45 In the new
Soviet society, the emancipated woman frequently sought specialized skills through
education. Stalin's second wife, Nadezhda Allilueva, came from a Bolshevik worker
family in which education was encouraged for all, including the daughters. She com¬
pleted her secondary education in the midst of revolution and civil war. A decade lat¬
er, she returned to study in the Industrial Academy of Moscow, where for a time she
worked alongside a young worker Communist from the Ukraine named Nikita Ser-
geevich Khrushchev.
The makings of the new Soviet elite were visible in institutions such as this one.
The working class had by the mid-1920s occupied a share ofthe openings in higher
education greater than its proportion of the entire population.46 The result repre¬
sented in one sense a continuation ofthe democratization process evident in the late
tsarist years, testimony to the increasing desire for higher education among larger
and larger numbers of Russians from all classes. It also reflected the new political
power of the Proletariat, many of whose members had—like Khrushchev—entered
the party since the revolution and were seeking to achieve economic expertise
through learning as well as political power. One Western scholar has recentiy argued
that the Young Communist Organization and new worker Communists pushed parti¬
cularly hard to have the Soviet State open up to workers and peasants special access
to higher education by ending the policy of democratization and introducing socially
discriminatory policies. She suggests that they did so primarily to be able to use edu¬
cation as a means of "upward mobility out of the working class and peasantry" for
entry "into the new ruling elite of the Soviet state."
43. Salo Baron, The Russian Jew Under Tsar and Soviets (New York, 1964), 273.
44. Lane, table 5, 248.
45. Lapidus, 207.
46. See James McClelland, "Proletarianizing the Student Body: The Soviet Experience during
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Their educational aspirations developed more rapidly than governmental policy
was ready to admit. Until the late 1920s, their appeals went unheeded. Academic
Standards remained high, with the natural result that few of the worker recruits to ad¬
vanced schooling graduated. By 1928, a mere 10,000 Communists had completed
some sort of advanced schooling.47 Only a radical change in educational policy
would permit these politically active workers to achieve the educational credentials
necessary to occupy influential positions in the State and economic apparatus of the
new Communist regime.
With Stalin's rise to power, proletarianization of higher education became State
policy. The days of free enrollment in higher education were ended; purges of the
student body sought out and expelled the "socially alien elements" (who probably in
many cases found openings in other institutes, so chaotic were conditions and so eas¬
ily were documents falsified). When the educational system expanded rapidly during
the First Five-Year Plan, many of the new openings went to adult workers and peas¬
ants sent to receive special training as part of the new party elite. This Soviet "affir¬
mative action" brought by one estimate 150,000 adult workers into the Soviet student
body between 1928 and 1932.48 The dilemma of democratization versus proletarian
power was resolved in the Stalinist manner. Once again higher education became the
tool of political leaders seeking above all to protect and enhance their own power.
In effect, Stalin achieved in a decade what the tsarist regime had gradually created
in the first half of the 19th Century. The autocracy needed a bureaucracy to imple¬
ment new policies of social and political reform. It found its first recruits largely
among the old elite. Yet the process of social expansion of the state administration
created its own pool of recruits for higher education. One hundred years later Stalin,
once he had decided on the necessity of "proletarian cadres" for his new regime, cul¬
tivated the ambitious new Communists from the working class, offering them special
educational advantages and an active role in his socialist society of the 1930s in ex¬
change for their loyalty and service. They, like the State bureaucracy ofthe 19th Cen¬
tury, sought advantages for their children, using higher education as the means to
protect family status from generation to generation.
In conclusion, this study of Russian higher education and social stratification
points to the primaey of politics. Admission to institutions of advanced leaming re¬
flected above all the policies imposed by the regime. One might also conclude that the
disadvantaged groups in Russian society seeking schooling proved remarkably inge-
nious in finding openings in spite of the restrictive policies. Higher education was
perceived by the early 20th Century as the path to social advancement by middle as
well as upper classes, and in the 1920s this awareness apparently spread among the
working class. But admissions could not respond naturally to these pressures from
below as long as the govemment applied its discriminatory practices. Between the re¬
gime and society, the struggle was an unequal one. Control over higher education
gravitated to those in power. Those who served the state well could find among their
rewards access to higher education. This rule was true in the 1840s and remains so today.
47. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934 (New York,
1979), 16-17, 110.
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